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ISSUES REGARDING THE MOST EFFECTIVE TOOL OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW:
‘THE AUTOMATIC STAY’
by
ZEENAT KERA
(Under the Direction of Professor Lorie Johnson)
ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses three areas in which there have been important developments
concerning the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy law, provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362. The
first part of the thesis addresses and analyses the question whether state courts have jurisdiction
to determine their own jurisdiction when the automatic stay is at issue. The consensus, however,
now seems to favor the traditional and correct view, that while bankruptcy courts alone have
jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay, state courts, have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay
does or does not cut off its jurisdiction to reach the merits of a case. The second topic is whether
a state court has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an alleged violation of the stay. The
analysis, with the help of case laws will show that even if a state court or another federal court
has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, only the bankruptcy court where the case
is pending has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violating the stay. The third part of the thesis
explains and analyses issues concerning repossession of property by a creditor before the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.
INDEX WORDS:
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I. INTRODUCTION TO BANKRUPTCY LAW:
The term bankruptcy law is generally used to refer to federal law- title 11 of the United
States Code, commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code.1 The current law became effective
October 1, 1979, after President Carter signed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on November
1978.2 This Act has been amended on many occasions, the three major amendments being the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984; Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986; and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.3

Bankruptcy CodeThe Bankruptcy Code is comprised of eight chapters that follow odd numbers- 1, 3, 5, 7,
11, and 13 with the addition of Chapter 12 for family farmers in the year 1986.4 Chapters 1, 3, 5,
contain provisions of general applicability in all types of bankruptcy cases.5 The Chapters 7, 9,
11, 12 and 13 specify a particular type of bankruptcy case, provisions of which apply exclusively
to those cases under it.6 The most common type of bankruptcy case is one under Chapter 7,
providing for a liquidation or sale of the debtor’s assets and distribution of the net proceeds to
creditors, as opposed to some form of rehabilitation of the debtor, as provided for by the
remaining Chapters, i.e. Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13.7

1

See 11 U.S.C. 101 et. seq.
Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, CERTIFIED INSOLVENCY AND RESTRUCTURING
ADVISOR (CIRA) Study Course, 2 (Revised 2003) (unpublished CIRA study course).
3
Id.
4
Charles Jordan Tabb, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, 14 (Foundation Press 1997).
5
Id. at 14-15
6
Id. at 15
7
Id.
2
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Chapter 13 is usually perceived to be the alternative to Chapter 7 for consumer debtors.8
Chapter 12 is a Chapter 13 clone, which is available to family farmers.9 Chapter 11 is the basic
reorganization Chapter.10 Chapter 9, seldom invoked, permits the adjustments of the debts of a
municipality.11

Bankruptcy CourtsStructure:
Bankruptcy courts are federal courts with jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Bankruptcy Code (Title 11 of the United States Code).12 Technically, bankruptcy courts receive
cases that are referred to them by the Federal District Court; thus, Federal District Courts have
power to retain jurisdiction over cases arising under Title 11.13
Appeals of a bankruptcy court decision go through the trial district court first, and are then
appealable through the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.14
With the consent of all interested parties, appeals may also be brought to the Bankruptcy Appeals
Panel, if a panel exists in the Circuit in which the appeal is made, which is generally composed
of three sitting bankruptcy judges.15

8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See 11 U.S.C. (1994).
13
28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
14
28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994).
15
Id.

9

2

II. CORE PROCEEDINGS:
For a bankruptcy judge to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter, the bankruptcy judge must
determine that the issues to be resolved are core proceedings.16 Once an issue is determined to
be a core proceeding, a bankruptcy court may issue decisions and apply non- bankruptcy law in
the same manner as any other federal court.17 For example, if one of the claims in a Chapter 11
case is for patent infringement, the bankruptcy court could effectively hold a trial on the issue of
patent infringement within the ambit of a hearing to objections on claims.18 This allows the
bankruptcy court to settle most matters related to the bankruptcy estate in one courtroom. The
following is a list of some of the matters considered core proceedings:
1. [M]atters concerning the administration of the estate.19
2. Allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemption from the property of
the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purpose of confirming a plan under
Chapter 11, 12, or 13 of Title 11, but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for the
purposes of distribution in a case under Title 11.20
3. Counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.21
4. Orders to turn over property of the estate.22
5. Proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences.23
6. Motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay.24
7. Proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances.25
8. Determinations as to dischargeability of particular debts.26
9. Objections to discharges.27
16

See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994).
See, Association of Insolvency Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 4.
18
Id.
19
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(1994).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1994).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.

17
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10. Confirmations of plans.28
11. Orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral.29
12. Orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims brought
by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate.30
The bankruptcy judge determines whether a matter is a core proceeding.31

28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
See, Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 5.

29
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III. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE: (11 U.S.C §§ 541, 542)
When a voluntary petition is filed or when an order for relief is entered in an involuntary
proceeding, all property of the debtor vests in a bankruptcy estate.32 This includes all legal and
equitable interests in property and in causes of action as well as any property recovered by the
debtor-in-possession during the course of bankruptcy.33 The interests of the debtor and the
debtor’s spouse in community property is also included in the estate if the debtor exercises any
control over the property or the property was used to secure the debt that has matured into a
claim against the debtor.34
The Bankruptcy Code has a very comprehensive definition of property of the estate of a
debtor. Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code includes in the estate all legal and equitable
interests of the debtor, wherever located and by whomever held.35
Section 541(c)(1) states that property of the debtor will be included in the estate, notwithstanding
any provision in an agreement or applicable non bankruptcy law that restricts or conditions such
a transfer, including those that provide that property reverts to a creditor conditioned on the
bankruptcy, financial condition or insolvency of the debtor.36
There is one exception to this treatment in section 541(c)(2), which states that, “a restriction on
the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable

32

Questions of whether or not an item is included in the estate are almost always resolved in favor of inclusion: See
In re Richard L. Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984) (IRA assets are property of the estate and can be used to
satisfy debts of the estate); Under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)(5) any property received by the debtor within 180 days of
filing as an inheritance, death benefit, or a divorce settlement becomes property of the estate.
33
See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 202.
34
11 U.S.C. § 542(a)(2) (1994).
35
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994).
36
11 U.S.C. § 542(c)(1) (1994).
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non bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”37 The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code indicates that this exception was intended to keep the assets of any spendthrift
trust of which the debtor was a beneficiary out of the debtor’s estate in recognition of the wishes
of the settler.38
While section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to retain certain exempt
assets, these assets go into the estate. Under that section, a decision has to be made as to whether
the property qualifies for one of the exemptions under section 522 or under the applicable state
law.39

37

11 U.S.C. § 542(c)(2) (1994).
See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 203.
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994).

38
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IV. ADEQUATE PROTECTION: (11 U.S.C. § 361)
General ConceptIn instances where a creditor’s security interest in an asset is endangered, depreciating, or
being dissipated by the debtor’s actions, the creditor may move the court for adequate
protection.40 When a creditor seeks adequate protection, he is asking the court to ensure that the
status quo will be maintained throughout the duration of the stay.41 The court has broad
discretion in the method it chooses to remedy adequate protection problems.
The legislative history indicates the process that the Congress intended to resolve
adequate protection problems. First, the trustee or the debtor-in-possession should propose a
method for providing adequate protection.42 Then the creditor can accept, object or negotiate an
alternative solution.43 If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the court will step in to resolve
the dispute.44
Though a creditor may enter an adequate protection motion with a desire to continue a
foreclosure action or stop the debtor from granting an additional lien on property in which the
creditor holds a security interest, the court may order an alternative remedy.45 The court may
require the debtor-in-possession to make cash payments to the creditor in instances where the
value of the collateral is decreasing or where the amount of any security cushion is eroding
40

A motion for adequate protection can be brought under the Bankruptcy Code § 362 (relief form automatic stay), §
363 (motion to halt the use of cash collateral), or § 364 (regarding the granting of liens on previously encumbered
property).
41
There are three seminal cases in the adequate protection area: In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984), In re Briggs Transportation Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985) & United Savings of America v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Association, 484 U.S. 365(1988).
42
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1994).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.

7

where interest accrues.46 The court may also choose to grant relief from the stay in order to
allow the creditor to seize assets in which the creditor holds a security interest.47 The court must
balance the danger to the interest of the creditor against the necessity of the property to the
debtor in the reorganization.48
Adequate protection may be required under three Bankruptcy Code sections:
1. “Section 362 with the automatic stay—For example, unless the security interest of the
debtor is adequately protected, the court may remove the stay.”49
2. “Section 363 dealing with the use (including the use of cash collateral), sale or lease of
property of the debtor—For example, the court may not approve the release of cash
collateral until it has been determined that the impacted creditors are adequately
protected.”50
3. “Section 364 dealing with the obtaining of credit—For example, before the court might
approve the granting of a senior or equal lien under the priming of a secured creditor, the
court must ascertain that the creditor is adequately protected.”51
Adequate protection, according to section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, may be provided by:
1. “Requiring the trustee or debtor-in-possession to make cash payments to the extent that
the stay under section 362, or the use, sale, lease under section 363, or the grant of a lien
under section 364 results in a decrease in the value of the entity’s interest in such
property.”52

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
49
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
50
See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
51
See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994).
52
See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994).

47
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2. “Providing an additional or replacement lien to the extent that the stay, use, sale, or lease
or grant results in a decrease in value of the entity’s interest in such property.”53
3. “Granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to an administrative expense,
that will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of the
entity’s interest in such property.”54
The meaning of “indubitable equivalent” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. It often
involves the substitute of one asset as collateral by another asset of lesser value in the case of
debtor-in-possession financing.55 Note that the requirement is that the debtor must have the
opportunity to realize the indubitable equivalent of the entity’s interest in the property and not
the value of the property.56 Actually, this language has been held to refer to cases where more
than one entity has an interest in the collateral. The following analysis is still true- but it is
independent of the quoted language. Thus, if the creditor is adequately protected, then the debtor
may be able to substitute less favorable collateral for the existing collateral.57 The bankruptcy
court may look at the equity cushion or analyze special risk factors in determining if the debtor is
adequately protected in these cases.58

Equity CushionAn equity cushion is the value in the property, above the amount owed to the creditor
with a secured claim that will shield that creditor or claim from loss due to any decrease in the
value of the property during the time the automatic stay remains in effect.59
53

See 11 U.S.C.§ 361 (1994).
Id.
55
See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.

54
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Shortly after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, a large number of courts began to
evaluate the amount of the equity cushion that exists to determine if some form of adequate
protection was necessary to prevent the relief from the automatic stay.60 The bankruptcy court in
In re McKilips,61 analyzed prior cases and concluded that an equity cushion of less than 11
percent is sufficient and a range between 12 and 20 percent has divided the courts.62

60

See Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205.
In re McKilips, 81 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
62
See, Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors, supra note 2, at 205.

61
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V. THE AUTOMATIC STAY: (11 U.S.C. § 362)
General ConceptThe automatic stay is an integral structural component of a U.S. bankruptcy case and is
akin to a statutory injunction.63 It is self -executing, effective upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.64 It is essential to the realization of two core functions of a bankruptcy case: (i) the
equitable treatment of multiple creditor claims and (ii) a financial fresh start for honest debtors.65
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whether voluntary or involuntary, the automatic stay of
section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code comes into effect. The stay applies to all entities and
essentially provides for an injunction against litigation, lien enforcement or other actions taken
against a debtor or the estate to either enforce or collect pre-petition claims.66 Creditors are
precluded from getting a jump on their fellow creditors and the debtor is given a ‘breathing spell’
in order to enable him to reorganize.67 The stay, thus seeks to preserve the status quo as of the
date the bankruptcy case is commenced until such time as the bankruptcy court can act.68 In
addition, the stay prevents many other actions, formal or informal, which might affect property
of the debtor of the estate.
The broad scope of the automatic stay is illustrated in In re Sportfame of Ohio,Inc.,69
Defendant Wilson Sporting group refused to ship its products to debtor, Sportfame, unless

63

See Tabb, supra note 2, at 36.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.at 39-40.
68
Id.
69
In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 Bankr. 47 (N.D. Ohio1984).

64
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Sportfame paid off pre-petition arrearages.70 While Wilson did not file any formal action against
Sportfame, the conditioning of future shipments’ wages upon payment of arrearages was a
violation of the automatic stay.71 Under the language of this case, any coercive action on the part
of a creditor designed to pay a pre-petition debt can be a violation of the automatic stay.72 The
remedy imposed by the court was to issue a mandatory injunction requiring Wilson to ship goods
to Sportfame on a normal basis.73
The following acts are expressly subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a):
1. [T]he commencement, continuation of any judicial, administrative or other proceeding
against the debtor which was or could have been commenced pre-petition, or any other
proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor arising pre-petition.74
2. The enforcement of a judgment against either the debtor or the property of the estate.75
3. Any act to obtain property of the estate, and any act to exercise control over the estate.76
4. Any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate.77
5. Any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against the property of the estate to the
extent that the lien secures a pre-petition claim.78
6. Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose pre-petition.79
7. The setoff of any debt owing to the debtor arising pre-petition against any claim against
the debtor.80
8. The commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning the debtor.81

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id. at 56-57.
73
Id.
74
Jonathan L. Flaxer, How to Handle Consumer Bankruptcy Cases: A Practical Step-by-Step Guide, 52 PLI/NY,
283 (1999); see In re Gucci, 126 F. 3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567 (2d Cir.1994)
75
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see Claughton v. Mixson, 33 f.3d 4,5 (4th superth Cir. 1994); In re Siskin, 231
B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
76
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see In re Wicks, 176 B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d 215 B.R. 316
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
77
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see In re Layton, 220 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Ferrante,
195 B.R. 990 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996).
78
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 286; see James v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank (In re Brooks), 871 F.2d 89, 90 (9th
superth Cir.1989).
79
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 287; see Sosne v. Reinert & Dureg, P.C. (In re Just Brakes System Inc.,) 108 F.3d
881, 884 (8th superth Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 364, 139 L.Ed.2d 283 (1997).
80
See Flaxer, supra note 75, at 287; see AETNA Casualty & Surety Co. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., (In re Chateaugay
Corp.) 94 F 3d 772, 781 (2d Cir. 1996); Town of Hempstead Employees Fed. Credit Unoin v. Wicks, 215 B.R. 316
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Inosphere Clubs, Inc., 177 B.R. 198, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
81
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 287; see In re CF & I Fabricators, Inc., 148 B.R. 332, 341 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992).
71
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While the automatic stay of section 362(a) precludes many acts against the debtor or property
of the estate, the following acts are excepted from the stay pursuant to section 362(b):
1. [T]he commencement or continuation of a criminal action against the debtor.82
2. The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding to determine paternity or
for the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support,
and attempts to collect alimony, maintenance or support from property that is not
property of the estate.83
3. Any act to perfect or to maintain or continue the perfection of an interest of an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection
pursuant section 546(b), or to the extent that such perfection is accomplished within the
statutory period provided in section 547(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.84
4. The commencement or continuation of an action or proceedings by a governmental unit
to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.85
5. The enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s regulatory or police power.86
6. Setoffs relating to certain securities and commodities transactions.87
7. Setoffs relating to repurchase, or “repo’, agreements.88
8. The commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust that is or was insured by the National Housing
Act and which covers property or combinations of property consisting of five or more
living units.89
9. An audit by a governmental unit to determine tax liability, the issuance of a notice of tax
deficiency by a governmental unit; a demand for tax returns; or the making of an
assessment for any tax and the issuance of a notice and demand for payment of such
assessment.90

82

See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see In re Maloney, 204 B.R. 671 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Newman, 196
B.R. 700, 764 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1996).
83
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see Terio v. Terio, 1994 W.L. 141980 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d 52 F. 3d 310 (2d
Cir. 1995); In re Cole, 202 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
84
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 288; see Klien v. Civale Trovato, Inc. (In re The Lionel Corp.), 29 F. 3d 88 (2d.
Cir.1994)
85
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial,
Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 112 S.Ct. 459, 116 L.8d 2d 358 (1991).
86
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See State of New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 1996 WL 12031 (N.D.N.Y. 1996);
In re Ngan Gung Restaurant, Inc., 183 B.R. 689, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
87
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 289; See Wolkowitz v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re Weisberg), 136 F.3d 655,
657 (9th superth Cir 1998).
88
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 290; See Cohen v. Savings Bldg. & Loan Co. (In re Bevill, Bresler, & Schulman
Asset Mgt. Corp.), 896 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1990).
89
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8)(1994).
90
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 290; see In re Carlson, 198 B.R. 949, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 915 (7th
superth Cir. 1997), cert. denied. Carlson v. United States, 523 U.S. 1060, 118 S.Ct. 1388 (1998); In re Neary, 220
B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).
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10. Any act by a lessor to the debtor under a lease of on residential real property which has
expired by its terms either pre-petition or during the bankruptcy case to obtain possession
of such property.91
11. The presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting
dishonor of such an instrument.92
12. &13. In a case involving a debtor subject to reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, after ninety days after the petition date, the commencement or
continuation, and conclusion to the final judgment, of an action to foreclose a ship or
fleet mortgage or a mortgage or other interest in a fishing facility held by the Secretary of
Transportation or Secretary of Commerce.93
14. Any action by an accrediting agency regarding the accreditation status of the debtor as
an educational facility.94
15. Any action by a State licensing body regarding the licensure of the debtor as an
educational institution.95
16. Any action by a guaranty agency regarding the eligibility of the debtor to participate in
programs under the Higher Education Act of 1965.96
17. The setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim in connection with certain
swap agreements.97
18. The creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax.98
The automatic stay of any act against property generally remains in effect unless such
property is no longer property of the estate.99 The stay of any other act listed in the Bankruptcy
Code § 362(a) remains in effect until the earlier of the time the case is closed, the time the case is
dismissed or, the time the debtor receives a discharge.100
The court may terminate, annul, modify or condition the automatic stay upon the request of a
party in interest if there is a cause, such as a lack of adequate protection of that party’s interest in
property, or, with respect to stay of an act against property under the Bankruptcy Code § 362(a),
if the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective
91

See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 291; see In re Salzer, 52 52 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Salzer v. Stinson,
516 U.S. 1177, 116 S.Ct. 1273 (1996).
92
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 291; see In re Mills, 176 B.R. 924, 928 (D. Kan. 1994); In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125
(Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1998).
93
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 291; see Adams v. S/V “Tenacious” , 203 B.R. 297 (D. Alaska 1996).
94
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 292; See In re Statewide Oilfield Construction Co., Inc., 134 B.R. 399 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1991).
95
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(15) (1994).
96
See Flaxer, supra note 75, at 292; see In re Betty Owen Schools, Inc., 195 B.R. 23, 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
97
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17)(1994).
98
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 292; In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 227 B.R. 775 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998).
99
See Flaxer, supra note 74, at 293.
100
Id.

14

reorganization.101 If the court should rule upon a party’s request for relief from an automatic
stay of an act against property of the estate within thirty days after the request, the stay is
automatically terminated as to the party making the request, unless the court, after notice and a
hearing, orders otherwise.102
The party requesting relief from the stay bears the burden of proof on the issue of the
debtor’s equity in the property.103 The debtor bears the burden of proof on all other issues.104 If
any individual is injured by any willful violation of the automatic stay, that individual may
recover actual damages including costs, attorneys’ fees, and in some cases, punitive damages as
well.105
Section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for relief from the stay. Section 362(h)
states: “Any individual injured by the willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall
recover actual damages, including costs, and attorneys’ fees, and in, appropriate circumstances,
may recover punitive damages.”106
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VI. AUTOMATIC STAY ISSUES:
IntroductionThe automatic stay is fundamental to the bankruptcy process, and only the bankruptcy
court in which the case is pending has jurisdiction to grant or deny relief from the stay.107 The
point of contention is whether a state court or more generally, a non bankruptcy tribunal has
jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies in the first instance, and what effect should be
given to a judgment rendered when the non bankruptcy forum decides, perhaps erroneously, that
the stay does not apply.108 The question comes down to whether state courts have jurisdiction to
determine their own jurisdiction when the stay is at issue. Federal courts have been divided on
this question.109 The consensus, however, now seems to favor the traditional view that, while
bankruptcy courts alone have jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay, state courts like non
bankruptcy federal courts, have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay does or does not cut
off the tribunal’s jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case.110 Federal courts should be bound
by a state court ruling in this respect.111
A second and related topic is whether a state court, or more generally, any forum, other
than the bankruptcy court where a case is pending, has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an
alleged violation of the stay. Although this question has not arisen frequently, the weight of
107
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authority now holds that, even if a state court or another federal court has jurisdiction to
determine whether the stay applies, only the bankruptcy court where the case is pending has
jurisdiction to call a party to task for violating the stay.112 This follows from the more general
principle that only a court seized of a case may impose sanctions for interference with that
court’s orders or process.113
A third type of stay dispute has arisen particularly in the context of consumer
bankruptcies.114 If a creditor has lawfully repossessed a debtor’s property before filing of the
bankruptcy petition (pre-petition), but if the property has not been sold or title has not been
passed, so that the debtor still retains rights in the property, courts have disagreed strongly as to
whether the creditor violates the stay, by simply retaining the property until adequate protection
is provided.115 Some courts have held that the creditor has an absolute duty to turn over the
property regardless of adequate protection, and hence that the creditor violates the stay if this is
not done.116 Others have held that merely retaining the property does not violate the stay and
that the creditor has no duty to surrender the property until adequate protection is given.117
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(a) Do State Courts Have Jurisdiction To Determine Their Own Jurisdiction When The
Automatic Stay Is At Issue?
Overview of the problem:
A bankruptcy court where a case is pending has exclusive original jurisdiction to grant or
deny relief from the stay.118 No other court may do so as an original matter.119 Although
bankruptcy courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to grant relief from the stay, it is
universally conceded that other federal courts may decide whether the stay applies to them in a
case before them.120 If a lower federal court erroneously decides that the stay does not apply and
proceeds to render a judgment that judgment is not subject to collateral attack.121 The only
remedy is by way of direct appeal.122 If the reviewing federal court decides that the stay did
apply, the proper step for the higher court to take is not to reverse the judgment, or even to reach
to the merits of the case.123 The reviewing court, should, rather vacate the judgment on the
ground that the stay deprived the lower court of jurisdiction to render any judgment at all.124
The area of dispute has been whether the same principles apply to state courts. The
majority rule has been that state courts like non bankruptcy federal courts, have jurisdiction to
decide whether a stay applies in a pending action.125 If a lower state court erroneously holds that
the stay does not apply and proceeds to render a judgment, the proper course is not to attack the
118
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judgment collaterally.126 Rather, relief should be sought in a higher state court, and ultimately, if
necessary, in the United States Supreme Court.127
A few cases have, however, held that the state courts do not even have jurisdiction to
determine whether the stay applies.128 Thus, a state appellate court would lack jurisdiction to
correct the errors of a lower court in this respect because state reviewing courts, like state trial
courts, lack jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the stay.129 Therefore, state court
judgments allegedly rendered in violation of the stay are subject to collateral review in the
bankruptcy court.130 If the bankruptcy court decides that the stay was violated, it may disregard,
or even vacate, the state court’s judgment.131 The bankruptcy court’s decision that the stay did or
did not apply to the state court action would then be subject to direct review in the federal
judicial system.132

Cases holding that the state courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies:
1. Raymark Indus., Inc. v Lai133
Raymark Indus., Inc. v Lai134 was one of the early cases to imply that state courts do not
have jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applies.135 There, a products liability plaintiff had
obtained a judgment against Raymark Industries in a California court.136 Raymark had paid a
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deposit into court to stay the execution of the judgment.137 Subsequently, an involuntary
bankruptcy petition was filed against Raymark in the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.138
Although Raymark had been preparing an appeal in the tort case, Raymark contended that the
entire proceeding was subject to the automatic stay.139 Relying on bankruptcy precedents to the
effect that an action against a pre-petition deposit into court did not violate the stay, the
bankruptcy court held that the stay did not apply, and the district court affirmed.140
Furthermore, Raymark had not transmitted the complete record to the California Court of
Appeals, maintaining that the stay barred any further action in the lawsuit.141 The state appellate
court dismissed Raymark’s appeal for want of diligent prosecution.142 In the appeal from the
decision of the lower federal courts, the Third Circuit reversed the district court and the
bankruptcy court and held that the state court proceeding was stayed by virtue of 11 U.S.C. §
362(a).143 The Third Circuit held that reliance on bankruptcy precedents was misplaced.144 This
reversal of the lower federal court’s decision presented no remarkable jurisdictional issues.
In the present case, the Third Circuit Court chose to address the decision of the California
Court of Appeals dismissing Raymark’s appeal.145 The Third Circuit conceded that with
exceptions not relevant to the case at bar, lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to collaterally
review the merits of a state court decision.146 The Third Circuit, however, maintained that a
federal court may collaterally review a state court’s express or implied determination of its own
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jurisdiction.147 The Third Circuit held that state actions taken in violation of the stay are void ab
initio.148 The state appellate court’s decision to dismiss the debtor’s appeal was based on a
mistaken conclusion that the stay did not apply.149 The Third Circuit, thus concluded that the
decision of the California Court of Appeals was void.150 The federal court remanded the case
with directions to the bankruptcy court to vacate the judgment of the state appellate court and
thus to reinstate the state court appeal.151
The Raymark Indus.152 decision was noteworthy in its holding that a federal bankruptcy
court had the authority to render an order vacating the decision of a state court of appeals.153 The
decision, however, offered no real explanation as to why a federal court may not collaterally
review the merits of a state court decision but why nonetheless it may review a state court’s
decision as to its own jurisdiction.154 The only explanation that would make the Raymark
Indus155 holding coherent is that the state court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the stay
applies.156 Thus, when a state court’s judgment allegedly violates the stay, a bankruptcy court
should conduct a de novo review of that question.157 If the bankruptcy court determines
independently that the stay does not apply, then it must give full faith and credit to the state court
judgment on the merits.158 If, however the stay did apply, then the bankruptcy court should
vacate the judgment without reference to the merits.159
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For several years Raymark Indus.160 was something of an anomaly, and it aroused
relatively little attention.161 It was a series of decisions from the Ninth Circuit that thrust to the
fore the question of state court jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the stay.162
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in In re Gruntz163
In re Gruntz164 involved the criminal prosecution and conviction of the debtor, Robert
Gruntz for failure to pay child support.165 The District Attorney of the Los Angeles County had
sought and obtained a conviction under section 270 of the California Penal Code.166 Both in the
state trial court and on appeal, Gruntz had argued that the courts of California had no jurisdiction
because the action violated the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (prohibiting the
commencement or continued prosecution of any action against the debtor that was begun or
could have begun before the commencement of the case).167 The state court of appeals held that
the case fell squarely within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), which exempts from the stay the
commencement or continuation of any criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.168 After
his state court convictions were final, Gruntz filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
court seeking to nullify the criminal convictions on the ground that the state court courts lacked
jurisdiction to decide that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) applied, particularly in light of Hucke v. State of
Oregon.169 The bankruptcy court dismissed Gruntz’s complaint on res judicata grounds, noting
160
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that the applicability of the stay had been presented to and been rejected by the California court
and was the same affirmed by the district court.170
In two sharply divided panel opinions, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applied and to collaterally review
the state court convictions.171 The majority in both panel opinions held that the state court
determination that the stay applied was in no way binding on federal courts, and that the
bankruptcy court could disregard the fact that the state court had erred and the stay did not
apply.172 The majority held that neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine173 nor preclusion applies
when rendering forum has acted in the absence of all jurisdiction; and, according to panel
majorities, only the bankruptcy court has initial jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies
at all.174
In sharp dissents in both panels, Judge Fletcher maintained that the California courts had
already decided that the stay did not apply and hence that they had jurisdiction over the criminal
prosecution.175
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On February 3, 2000, the Ninth Circuit handed down its final decision in Gruntz in a
unanimous ruling.176 The Ninth Circuit reiterated the earlier holdings of the panel majorities that
federal courts are not bound in any fashion by a state court ruling when the state court has acted
in absence of all jurisdiction.177 In such a case, the state court judgment is a nullity and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.178 The Gruntz179 court, however, framed the issue not
as to whether a state court has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, but rather as
whether a state court has jurisdiction to grant relief from the stay.180 The court pointed out that
granting relief from the stay is a core matter and the court then came to the unremarkable
conclusion that only the bankruptcy court in which the bankruptcy case is pending has
jurisdiction as an initial matter to vacate, annul, modify or lift the stay.181 The court went on to
state that a federal court should examine the motives for a state court prosecution only in the
rarest and most egregious circumstances.182
The Ninth Circuit in In re Durbar,183 held squarely that no state tribunal, whether judicial
or administrative, has jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applies.184 Original jurisdiction
over that question is vested exclusively in the non-bankruptcy court where the case is pending.185
According to Dunbar,186 then if a state forum takes some action that allegedly violates the stay,
that decision is always open to collateral review in the bankruptcy court, even if the state court
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has declared that the stay does not apply.187 The bankruptcy court’s examination must be de
novo.188 If the bankruptcy court determines independently that the stay does not apply, then it
must give full faith and credit to the state tribunal’s decision on the merits.189 If however, the
bankruptcy court determines independently that the stay did apply, then the bankruptcy court
should enjoin the enforcement of the state forum’s orders, vacate the state decision, or otherwise
refuse to extend full faith and credit.190
3. In re Rainwater191
In Rainwater, an Alabama state court had revoked the debtor wife’s probation postpetition, following her pre-petition conviction for theft.192 The bankruptcy court issued a writ of
habeas corpus, awarded declaratory and injunctive relief, and refused to award damages.193 The
most important aspect of the Rainwater194 decision was that the court held that the stay barred
the revocation proceeding and that a federal court could collaterally review the state court’s
decision.195 The bankruptcy court held that a criminal prosecution or a probation proceeding is
not exempted from the stay if the purpose of the action is to enforce or collect a claim or a debt,
and that restitution falls into that category.196 The court held that the state court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the underlying action because of the stay; that a state court judgment
rendered under such circumstances was not entitled to full faith and credit; and that the RookerFeldman doctrine did not apply because of the lack of jurisdiction.197
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The district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s judgment on appeal.198 The court did
not reach the question of full faith and credit, or, of the applicability of the Rooker Feldman
doctrine.199 Rather, the district court emphasized the strong policy against federal interference
with state court criminal proceedings and rejected the idea that there is a debt collection
exception to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(1).200

Cases holding that state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies and that
federal courts are barred from collateral review of such jurisdictional decisions:
1. In re Singleton201
In In re Singleton202, the Ohio state court had decided that neither 11 U.S.C. § 362 nor the
co-debtor stay, (11 U.S.C. §1301), protected the property of a corporation owned by the Chapter
13 debtor, and the state court had ordered the sale of the debtor’s property.203 The debtor did not
seek review before an Ohio state Appellate court, but rather commenced an adversary proceeding
in a bankruptcy court in an effort to nullify the state court judgment and the sale.204 The
bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the bankruptcy
appellate panel affirmed.205
The Singleton206 court never discussed whether the state court had correctly interpreted
the Bankruptcy Code; rather the panel held that a lower federal tribunal lacked subject matter
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jurisdiction to address that question at all.207 The state court had jurisdiction to decide whether
the stay applied, even though the state court lacked jurisdiction to lift or modify the stay.208 For
a federal court to revisit the question whether the stay applied would amount to usurping the
functions of a state appellate court.209 The debtor’s proper remedy would have been to appeal to
a higher court in Ohio, and ultimately to seek review before the United States Supreme Court, if
necessary.210 The debtor had failed to follow that course, and a lower federal court could only
dismiss the action.211
2. In re Siskin212
In In re Siskin,213 creditors had obtained pre-petition judgments against the debtor in the
courts of New York.214 The debtor had refused to cooperate with examinations in aid of
execution, or otherwise, obey court orders.215 After the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
judgment creditors sought and obtained a contempt order and an order of commitment from a
state court.216 The debtor contended that the proceedings violated the stay, 11 U.S.C. §§
362(a)(1), (2), (6), but the state court rejected the argument.217 The debtor was incarcerated
briefly and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States district court for the Eastern
District of New York.218 The habeas corpus action was rendered moot when the debtor was
released from confinement.219

207

Id. at 536.
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 537
211
Id.
212
In re Siskin, 258 B.R. 554 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 555.
216
Id. at 557.
217
Id.
218
See id.
219
See id at 557-558.

208

27

The debtor then commenced adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking
sanctions against the creditors and their attorneys for a willful violation of the stay.220 Initially,
the bankruptcy court had agreed that the stay had been violated.221 The defendants, however,
maintained that the state court had already made a decision that the stay did not apply to the
contempt proceeding, and that the bankruptcy court was precluded from revisiting that
question.222 The bankruptcy court agreed and dismissed the adversary proceeding.223 The debtor
moved for reconsideration, asking the court to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Gruntz.224
In the opinion on reconsideration, the bankruptcy court rejected Gruntz,225 and adhered to
its earlier decision to dismiss the action seeking sanctions.226 The Siskin227 court reasoned that
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), does not give bankruptcy courts the authority to determine whether the stay
applies, and there is no principled reason to say that state courts do not have the same
authority.228 If the state court makes an erroneous decision as to the applicability of the stay- i.e.,
as to its own jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to seek relief in a higher state tribunal, not to ask
a federal bankruptcy court to slip into the robes of a state appellate court.229 The state court had
made an explicit or implicit decision that the stay did not apply.230 The Siskin231 court held that
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under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court lacked jurisdiction to collaterally review that
determination.232
The Siskin233 court noted that the contempt power lies at the very heart of the authority of
a state judicial system to vindicate the dignity and integrity of its own courts.234 If any tribunal
should interfere with or overturn a contempt order, it should be a higher court with the same
judicial system, not a federal bankruptcy court.235
3. In re Glass236
In In re Glass237 the court gave an analysis very much like the bankruptcy appellate
panel’s analysis in Singleton238 and rejected the reasoning of both, the majority in Gruntz I239 and
the Rainwater.240 In this case, the debtor brought an adversary proceeding seeking damages
from his former wife and her attorneys for an alleged stay violation.241 The former wife had
pursued a post-petition action in a Georgia court to hold the debtor in contempt for failure to pay
support pursuant to a divorce decree.242 The debtor had raised the stay issue, but the state court
had held that the action fell within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii), which exempts
from the stay, the commencement or continuation of any action for the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support.243 The Glass244 court refused to
revisit the Georgia court’s decision concerning the stay.245 Instead, like the Singleton246 panel,
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the Glass247 court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the court had
adjudicated the issue correctly.248 The debtor was asking the bankruptcy court to sit as a state
appellate court, and this was impermissible.249 Alternatively, the debtor was attempting to attack
the state court decision collaterally, which was likewise impermissible.250

Analysis supporting the view that state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay
applies:
The analysis as to why state courts should have jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies
to matters brought before it should begin by understanding the jurisdictional statute- 28 U.S.C. §
1334, and its effects.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and its effects
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334, states:
(a) [E]xcept as provided in sub-section (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11.
(b) “ Notwithstanding any act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts
other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction
of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in or related to cases under Title 11.”251
The Ninth Circuit in Gruntz252 and in Dunbar253 interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1334, by stating
that the same was a jurisdiction- divesting statute.254 The Rainwater255 court had reached the
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same conclusion as well.256 However, this statutory interpretation is mistaken.257 28 U.S.C. §
1334(a) vests district courts- and, by referral under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a),258 bankruptcy courts,
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.259 It is undoubted that this statute
deprives state courts of jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, but that is beside the point.260
The courts in Siskin261 and Glass,262 pointed out that 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) is not relevant
in determining whether state courts have jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay
applies.263 A proceeding to determine whether the stay applies to a given action is not “a case
under Title 11”, over which bankruptcy courts have ‘original and exclusive’ jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a).264 Moreover, the underlying state courts actions in all the cases discussed
above were not “cases under Title 11.”265 Both, the Siskin266 and the Glass267 court noted that
the pertinent jurisdictional statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which vests bankruptcy courts with
original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or
arising in, or related to cases under Title 11.”268 The Siskin269 and the Glass270 courts, therefore,
properly held that a proceeding to determine whether the stay applies at all is a proceeding
arising in or under the Bankruptcy Code or that is related to a bankruptcy case.271
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Another case which deserves mention and discussion here, is Andria D. Powell v.
Washington Land Co., INC.272 In this case, an appeal was brought to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals from the decision of the Superior Court of Washington.273 Here, the Appellant
was a tenant under a lease managed by the landlord, the Washington land company.274 The
Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia had entered a
default judgment against the Appellant and her husband, granting the landlord possession of the
property and the landlord then filed a writ of execution on the judgment against the Appellant.275
Eight days later, the appellant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code in the U.S. bankruptcy Court of the District of Columbia.276 Three days later, the agents of
the landlord attempted to evict the Appellant, pursuant to the Writ of Execution.277 The
Appellant then filed a complaint in the D.C. Superior Court alleging wrongful eviction, violation
of automatic stay resulting form the bankruptcy filing, and conversion.278 The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the appellant/debtor
appealed.279
The bankruptcy jurisdiction granted to the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b)
may be transferred to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157.280 Section 157(b) allows the
bankruptcy court to hear and decide cases as to which the district court has exclusive jurisdiction
under § 1334(a) (cases under “Title 11”) as well as “core proceedings” as to which the district
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court has original, but not exclusive jurisdiction under § 1334(b) (proceedings “arising under
Title 11” or arising in a case under Title 11.”)281 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
determined that in the context of the Bankruptcy Code’s jurisdictional statutory scheme, the
narrow issue was whether the complaint filed by the Appellant in the Superior Court was a “case
under Title 11” over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court) had exclusive
jurisdiction.282 If it was so, the Superior court would have no jurisdiction to hear the claim and
the court would have properly dismissed the Appellant’s compliant.283 If not, the Superior Court
would have jurisdiction because even if the claim could have been brought in U.S. District Court,
as a proceeding “arising under Title 11” over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court)
had original but not exclusive jurisdiction, the statute did not require that the claim be brought in
a federal court.284
The court, in holding that that the appellant’s claim for wrongful eviction, for violation of
the stay, and for conversion were within the Superior Court’s jurisdiction285, partly relied on the
explanation of the jurisdictional provisions, provided by the court in In re Brady, Texas, Mun.
Gas Corp 286 which stated : “Although the district courts ‘have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under Title 11,’ the district courts do not have ‘exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11.’ Thus, under §
1334, the only aspect of the bankruptcy proceeding over which the district courts and their
bankruptcy units have exclusive jurisdiction is the bankruptcy petition itself.”287
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“In other matters arising in or relating to Title 11 cases, unless the Code provides otherwise, state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction….”288
The Dunbar 289 decision and all the three Gruntz 290opinions reasoned that the stay is
fundamental to a bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case, and hence
that, by extension, bankruptcy jurisdiction over all stay issues should be exclusive.291 As Judge
Fletcher pointed out in his dissents in Gruntz I292 and Gruntz II293, however, courts may not use
policy considerations to rewrite statutes, and as a general rule, policy concerns alone cannot cut
off state court jurisdiction unless Congress has chosen to enact that policy.294
Nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and certainly nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 362, purports to deprive a
state court of jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies.295 A judgment
rendered in violation of the stay might be a nullity if a state court simply ignored the stay or was
not aware of it, but that does not mean that a determination by a non- bankruptcy tribunal that the
stay does not apply in the first instance would be a nullity.296
2. Rooker- Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker- Feldman doctrine is based on two Supreme Court rulings separated by 60
years, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman297 and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.298
The gist of the doctrine is that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review a state court
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judgment; such jurisdiction belongs only to the Supreme Court.299 In particular, lower federal
courts may not review a state court decision for errors in construing or applying federal law if the
state court actually decided the federal issue or if the alleged errors are “inextricably intertwined”
with the state court judgment.300 A claim in the federal court is inextricably intertwined with a
state court judgment if the relief requested in the federal forum would effectively nullify the state
court ruling, or if the claim in the federal court could succeed only to the extent that the federal
tribunal determined that the state court had erroneously decided the issues before it.301
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is related to principles of full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. §
1738, and to res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).302
Whereas the claim and issue preclusive effects of state court judgments are affirmative defenses
that may be waived and that have nothing to do with a federal court’s jurisdiction, RookerFeldman is a jurisdictional doctrine that declares that a lower federal court may not usurp the
functions of a state appellate court or of the Supreme Court.303 Even if the federal court would
otherwise have jurisdiction to consider the issue as an original matter, the federal court is
divested of jurisdiction if a state court has already decided.304 Thus, as it is jurisdictional, the
Rooker- Feldman doctrine should be applied even before reaching the question of res juidcata or
collateral estoppel.305
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The Siskin,306 Singleton,307 as well as the dissent in two panel decisions in Gruntz308
relied primarily on the Rooker- Feldman doctrine to conclude that a federal court may not disturb
a state court determination that the automatic stay does not apply.309 The Rainwater310 court,
however, denied that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine could shield a state court decision
concerning the stay from nullification.311
The question raised in Dunbar,312 Gruntz,313 Singleton,314 Siskin,315 Glass,316 and
Rainwater317 was precisely whether a state court determination that the stay did not apply cut off
a lower federal court’s authority to revisit that question, or to sit, in essence, as a reviewing
court.318 The Singleton,319 Siskin,320 and Glass321 courts gave thorough discussions of exceptions
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and properly concluded that none of those exceptions applied.322
First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when the statute vests exclusive jurisdiction
in federal courts or a particular class of federal courts and when a state court simply ignores or
defies the statute.323 For example, a state court judgment purporting to to lift, modify, or annul
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the stay would be void ab initio.324 The void ab initio exception to Rooker-Feldman is very
narrowly construed, however.325
Second, the doctrine does not apply if a federal statute specifically grants lower federal
courts the right to review state court judgments.326 For example, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254
authorize federal district courts to review state court decisions on habeas corpus proceedings.327
The Rooker- Feldman would be irrelevant in such an instance.328 Further, there is no comparable
bankruptcy statute.329
Third, the doctrine does not prevent the review of a state court judgment that was
procured by fraud, deception, accident or mistake.330 For example, if the debtor or another party
had actively concealed the existence of a bankruptcy case, from a state court, and if the state
court had then rendered the judgment against the debtor post-petition, a bankruptcy court could
disregard the judgment.331 No such fraud, deception or mistake appears to have been involved in
any of the cases discussed above.
Fourth, the doctrine has been held inapplicable when the party seeking relief in a federal
court does not have any reasonable opportunity to present his or her federal claim or defense in
state court.332 In such a case, the federal issue could not be considered inextricably intertwined
with the state court judgment.333
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Lastly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not bar a federal action by someone who was
not a party to a state court action or in privity with the party, and who, thus could not have raised
the federal issue or sought state court appellate review.334 In the cases at issue here, theses
exceptions did not come into play. The debtors were parties to the state court action and were
able to raise the automatic stay issue before the state tribunals.
Since no exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied, the bankruptcy appellate
panel in Singleton,335 and the bankruptcy courts in Siskin336 and Glass337 correctly decided that
lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the attacks of the debtors on the respective
state court judgments.338 Only state appellate courts, or, ultimately the Supreme Court could
review whether the state trial courts had interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 362 correctly.339 The
bankruptcy court’s opinion in Dunbar,340 Gruntz,341 and Raymark342 were simply erroneous and
would mistakenly allow lower federal courts to sit as appellate tribunals to review state court
decisions.343
3. Full Faith and Credit and Preclusion
The Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires a federal court to give a state
court’s judgment the same preclusive effects that they would be given by courts in the rendering
state.344 The courts have repeatedly held that when a state court has determined that the
automatic stay does not apply to an action pending in that forum, then the issue of the state
334
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court’s jurisdiction over the underlying action and the applicability of the stay may not be
relitigated in a federal tribunal.345 Reconsideration of the question of the applicability of the stay
is barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).346 A state court has jurisdiction to determine
its own jurisdiction, and the reconsideration of jurisdictional issues such as the stay is subject to
preclusion just like other issues.347 The merits of the judgment in the underlying state court case,
in turn, may not be relitigated under principles of res judicata (claim preclusion).348
The panel majorities in the first two Gruntz349 rightly acknowledged that the relitigation
of jurisdictional issues may be barred, and that the jurisdiction of the first court may be shielded
from collateral attack, even if the original court made an arguably erroneous determination that it
had subject matter jurisdiction.350 The Gruntz 351panel majorities, however, maintained that this
principle applied only when the original forum had undertaken an express examination of
grounds for its jurisdiction.352 Although the state courts in Gruntz353 had decided that the
automatic stay did not apply, they had apparently not made an explicit determination that they
had jurisdiction to make such a decision or to construe 11 U.S.C. § 362.354 Therefore, according

345

See In re Bona, 124 B.R. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Mann, 88 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (noting that the
debtor had placed the stay question squarely before the state court and that state court had rejected the debtor’s
position).
346
Young, supra note 108, at 56.
347
Id.; See also In re Cummings, 201 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
348
Young supra note 108, at 56; See also In re Martinez, 227 B.R. 442 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1998); In re Weller, 189
B.R. 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995).
349
Gruntz, 166 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.) (“Gruntz I”), opinion amended and superseded on reh’g, 177 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. )
(“Gruntz II”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, 177 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion on reh’g, 202 F.3d
1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Gruntz III”).
350
Young, supra note 108, at 56; See also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
351
Gruntz, 166 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.) (“Gruntz I”), opinion amended and superseded on reh’g, 177 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. )
(“Gruntz II”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, 177 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion on reh’g, 202 F.3d
1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Gruntz III”).
352
Young, supra note 108, at 56.
353
Gruntz, 166 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.) (“Gruntz I”), opinion amended and superseded on reh’g, 177 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. )
(“Gruntz II”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, 177 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion on reh’g, 202 F.3d
1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Gruntz III”).
354
Young, supra note 108, at 57.

39

to the panel majorities in Gruntz I355 and Gruntz II356, the reconsideration of the state court’s
subject matter jurisdiction was not precluded.357 The Dunbar 358court had held that for relevant
purposes, the distinction between the Rooker- Feldman and preclusive doctrines was
immaterial.359 If a state tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide whether the stay applied, its
decision concerning the stay would be entitled to no deference under any theory.360
There is no general requirement that a state court must expressly examine its jurisdiction
to determine its own jurisdiction.361 Moreover, a party that has had a reasonable opportunity to
raise the question of jurisdictional defects before the rendering forum and relied to do so may not
thereafter raise subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral attack, even if the rendering forum did
not explicitly address the jurisdictional issues.362 Thus, a party who claims that 11 U.S.C. § 362
bars an action in a bankruptcy forum must raise all arguments connected with that contention in
the rendering court or on direct appeal, not in a collateral attack.363 This reasoning may not
apply if a state court had rendered judgment while simply ignoring or defying a federal statute
ousting it of jurisdiction.364 That was not the case in Dunbar365 or any of the other relevant
cases.
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4. The weight of case-law
Before Gruntz366 scarcely any court of appeals had held that state courts lack jurisdiction
to determine whether the stay applies, or that 28. U.S.C. § 1334(a) gives bankruptcy courts
exclusive jurisdiction over that question.367 The only possible exception was Raymark,368 and
that court did not cite any statutory basis for its holding.369 Prior to 1999, the court of appeals
that had addressed the issue had held that non-bankruptcy tribunals had concurrent jurisdiction to
determine whether the stay applied, and hence to decide whether they had subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed with the cases pending before them.370 The Third Circuit and the Second
Circuit courts had also accepted this view.371 The lower courts in the Ninth Circuit had agreed
prior to Gruntz372 and Dunbar373 that non-bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
determine the applicability of the stay.374
The overwhelming majority of lower courts that have considered the issue have held that
state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay applies.375 Lower courts in
the Second Circuit, which are bound by In re Baldwin- United Corp. Litg.,376 have taken this
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position.377 In re Bona,378 and in Siskin379, the courts expressly rejected the notion that the
Baldwin380 holding was limited to federal courts.381 In the Sixth Circuit, where N.L.R.B. v.
Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 382state courts are deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction.383 In
the Eleventh Circuit, the Rainwater384 court’s position that state courts may not determine the
applicability of the stay is contrary to the holdings of other lower courts in that jurisdiction.385
Other bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit have consistently maintained that they are bound
by state court determinations as to whether the stay applied to state court proceedings.386 Lower
courts in other circuits have also held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate
the applicability of the stay, and that federal courts may not attack such determination
collaterally.387

(b) Do State Courts (Or Other Non-Bankruptcy Tribunals) Have Jurisdiction To Impose
Sanctions For An Alleged Violation Of The Automatic Stay?
A second and related topic is whether a state court, or, more generally, any forum other
than where the bankruptcy case is pending, has jurisdiction to impose sanctions for an alleged
violation of the stay.
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Following are few cases that address this issue:
1. Daniel Hawthorne v. Akhtar Hammed388
In this case, a collection agency, Oklahoma Collection Bureau (“OCB”), obtained a
default judgment against Hawthorne in an Oklahoma state court, based on his failure to pay
medical bills to Akhtar Hammeed.389 OCB then began garnishing the wages of Hawthorne.390
Hawthorne filed for bankruptcy some six months later, triggering an automatic stay.391
Nonetheless, OCB, allegedly lacking notice of Hawthorne’s bankruptcy, began garnishing its
wages, and Hawthorne lost his job as a result.392 Hawthorne then sued OCB and Hameed in a
state court under Oklahoma law for causing his job loss and emotional distress.393 A jury
ultimately awarded the Hawthorne, $ 175,000 in compensatory damages.394 On appeal, OCB
challenged the state court’s jurisdiction over Hawthorne’s action because they claimed that it
was based solely upon an alleged violation of the bankruptcy stay.395
The court first reasoned that “the bankruptcy court has the responsibility to determine the
effects of its own stay and to enforce its own orders…….Any proceedings involving the
bankrupt debtor are outside a state court’s jurisdiction.”396 The court, however, acknowledged
that it had not found any case involving a similar factual scenario.397 The court found that OCB
had a lawful right to garnish Hawthorne’s wages until he filed for bankruptcy.398 The court
explained that OCB’s acts “became ‘wrongful’ or ‘negligent’ only under federal law upon the
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imposition of the automatic stay.”399 Thus, the court reasoned that OCB’s alleged wrongful
garnishment was not actionable under state law because Hawthorne was not entitled to relief in
state court for acts arising solely from a violation of the automatic stay ordered by the federal
bankruptcy court.”400 Accordingly, the court held that state court lacked jurisdiction over
Hawthorne’s action, concluding: “This matter should have been brought before the bankruptcy
court for violation of its own order. This was the exclusive province of the bankruptcy court.”401
2. Halas v. Platek:402
Another jurisdictional issue was raised in Halas v. Platek,403 where the court held that
only bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violating the stay.404 In that
case, a state court lawsuit had been instigated against the debtor a few days pre-petition.405 The
debtor was allegedly unaware of this court action when he filed Chapter 13 petition.406 While
the stay was in effect, the state court rendered a default judgment against the debtor.407
Approximately a month afterwards, the debtor informed the plaintiff’s attorney of the
bankruptcy, apparently for the first time.408 The debtor’s bankruptcy case was dismissed and
closed a few months later.409
The plaintiff’s attorney in the state court action subsequently transferred the file to a
second attorney to enforce the judgment, and the second attorney caused the debtor’s wages to be
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garnished.410 Roughly a year after the bankruptcy court had dismissed his Chapter 13 case, the
debtor moved the state court to set aside the default judgment on the ground that the judgment
had been rendered in violation of the stay, i.e., the state court had lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.411 The debtor requested the return of the monies collected and any other relief that
the state court might deem just.412 The state court vacated its order.413 The state court believed
that it had jurisdiction to decide that the stay had applied to the action that had been before it,
although this jurisdictional issue was apparently not raised.414 The state court, however, denied
any further relief and ordered the debtor to pay the fees of the two attorneys.415
The debtor then returned to the bankruptcy court seeking sanctions against the two
attorneys under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) for willfully violating the stay.416 The bankruptcy court
reopened the case for the limited purpose of considering the Section 362(h) claim and then
denied the debtor’s motion on res judicata grounds.417 The debtor had sought equivalent relief in
the state tribunal, praying not only for the returns of the monies collected, but also for any other
relief that the state court might deem just and equitable.418 In other words, the debtor had asked
the state court, in effect, to impose sanctions for violating the stay.419 Having failed to obtain all
that he wanted in the state forum, the debtor was precluded from relitigating his claim in the
bankruptcy court.
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On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the state court had no jurisdiction to
impose sanctions for violating the stay.420 Therefore, regardless of whether this defense had
actually been alleged, the state court judgment could have no res judicata effect in a Section
362(h) proceeding before the bankruptcy court.421
The Halas422 district court pointed out that there was a dearth of legislative history concerning 11
U.S.C. § 362(h).423 The one court of appeals to address the issue had suggested that bankruptcy
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a stay violation under 11 U.S.C. §
362(h).424 As the district court in Halas425 correctly perceived, however, the Seventh Circuit’s
statements in Martin- Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,426 were only dicta, and,
moreover, the Seventh Circuit may have confused 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), which grants bankruptcy
courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, with 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b),
which grants bankruptcy courts original, but not exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings arising
in or under the Bankruptcy Code, and over proceedings related to a bankruptcy case.427
The Halas428 district court observed that a few state courts had addressed the issue.429 Of the two
that had discussed the matter at greatest lengths, the Hawthorne430 court had concluded that
bankruptcy courts alone have jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a stay violation, while the
Powell,431 court had decided that 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) creates a federal cause of action, but that
420
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such an action may be prosecuted in a state as well as a bankruptcy court.432 Ultimately, the
Halas433 district court found the reasoning in Hawthorne434 more persuasive.435
The Halas436 district court was correct in holding that only bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction to impose sanctions for stay violations, whether under Section 362(h) or
otherwise.437 In reaching this conclusion, however, the district court relied on two related and
complementary, but nonetheless distinct lines of authority and reasoning, seemingly without
realizing the difference.438 On the one hand, exclusive jurisdiction over stay violations is
essential to protect the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and
its property.439 On the other, the automatic stay is equivalent to an order of the bankruptcy court,
and it has long been settled that only the court whose authority had been violated, has
jurisdiction to impose sanctions on the offending party.440

Analysis supporting the view that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose
sanctions for violation of the automatic stay:
1. Bankruptcy court’s exclusive control over the case and the property of the estate
A bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case as per 28 U.S.C. §
1334(a).441 It also has exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the debtor as per 28 U.S.C. §
1334(e).442 The automatic stay functions to preserve and enforce that exclusive jurisdiction and
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to bring all claims under the oversight of one forum.443 The strong implication is that bankruptcy
courts must have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the stay through sanctions in order to maintain
its exclusive jurisdiction over the case and over the estate property.444 This appears to be the
reasoning behind the dicta in Martin- Trigona445, which the Halas446 district court cited.447
Several state courts have either held or opined that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) on these grounds.448
A number of decisions of the federal court seem to support this view. In Gonzales v.
Parks,449 the Ninth Circuit held that a state court was without jurisdiction to entertain a creditor’s
claim that the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition constituted an abuse of process.450 Such a
proceeding would amount to a collateral attack on the petition itself and undermine the
bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the case.451 The Gonzales452 court stated, “A
congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts includes the implied power to
protect that grant.”453 Following Gonzales,454 the court in Koffman v. Ostioimplant Technology,
Inc.,455 held that a corporation against which an involuntary Chapter 7 petition had been filed
could not maintain state law claims against an offending creditor either for filing an improper
petition or for allegedly violating the automatic stay.456 Because of exclusive federal control
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over bankruptcy, remedies had to be provided solely by federal law.457 The Sixth Circuit, in
Accord Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,458 held that there is no state law cause of action for
violating the stay; federal law preempts any state law in this regard.459 Moreover, federal courts
must have exclusive jurisdiction over stay violations in order to maintain uniformity.460
2. Only the court whose authority has been violated or disobeyed can impose sanctions for
such a violation or disobeyance
At a broader level, it has long been settled that only the court whose authority has been
flouted may impose sanctions for the violation, particularly by way of civil contempt
proceedings.461 Jurisdiction to sanction by way of civil contempt or any analogous method rests
exclusively with the court whose authority was ignored or whose orders were violated.462
The automatic stay is not an “order” of the bankruptcy court.463 The stay takes effect by
operation of law; an affirmative act by the bankruptcy court is required to lift or modify the
stay.464 Nonetheless, the stay is usually treated as equivalent to a bankruptcy court injunction,
and certainly only the bankruptcy court in which the case is pending has original jurisdiction to
grant relief from the stay.465 The Gruntz466 court stated : “The automatic stay is an injunction
issuing from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court orders are not subject to
collateral attacks in other courts.467
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11 U.S.C. § 362(h) was enacted in 1984 in order to make it easier for an aggrieved debtor
to recover for a stay violation; the standards governing a claim under Section 362(h) are not as
strict as in a proceeding under Section 105(a).468 For one thing, clear and convincing evidence is
required in a civil contempt proceeding whereas most courts hold that the standard proof under
Section 362(h) is merely preponderance of evidence.469 Moreover, some courts require proof of
bad faith before they will impose sanctions under Section 105(a).470 There is another difference
as well. Although a debtor or any aggrieved party with standing may seek sanction under
Section 105(a), there is a split of authority as to who may invoke Section 362(h).471 The great
weight of authority, however, holds that Section 362(h) speaks of an “individual” aggrieved by a
stay violation, and that this term refers only to a natural person.472 Corporate debtors or other
entities that are not natural persons must seek to vindicate their rights under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) if
the stay is violated.473
Although a proceeding to obtain sanctions under Section 362(h) may differ from a
proceeding under Section 105(a), the two server similar objectives, and both are functionally
equivalent to civil contempt actions for violating the automatic stay, which is treated as a court
order for relevant purposes.474 Indeed, there is nothing to prevent an individual debtor from
seeking to vindicate his or her rights under both statutes.475 Once this is understood, the
principles laid down in Ex parte Bradley 476 and Gray v. Petoseed Co., Inc.,477 immediately come
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into play.478 A state court has no more authority to entertain an action under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a),
which clearly applies only in bankruptcy courts.479 A state court simply has no jurisdiction to
vindicate the dignity or authority of a bankruptcy court, no matter what theory may be used.480
The best reasoned state court decisions have adopted this position.481 The Hawthorne482 court
stated: “The bankruptcy court has the power to control its own proceedings and to punish for
contempt any violations of Section 362…..The bankruptcy court has the responsibility to
determine the effects of its own stay and to enforce its own orders….Similarly, in Oklahoma, the
power of a state court to punish for contempt lies exclusively in the court whose order was
violated.”483 Likewise the court in Ramdharry v. Gurrer484 succinctly held: “This is a matter
which should be determined by the Bankruptcy Court, not the state court. An award of monetary
damages under Section 362(h) for a violation of a court order is rightfully within the jurisdiction
of the Court whose order was violated.”485
The Halas486 court cited both Hawthorne487 and Ramdharry488 with approval and placed
particular reliance on Hawthorne.489 This line of cases focusing on a court’s exclusive
jurisdiction to impose sanctions for violations of its own orders and to vindicate the integrity of
its own proceedings ultimately provides the strongest support for the district court’s decision in
Halas.490 The exclusive jurisdiction of any court to impose civil penalties for violation of its
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own authority leads to the conclusion that only bankruptcy court may impose sanctions for a stay
violation, whether under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) or 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).491

(c) Issues Pertaining To The Repossession Of The Debtor’s Property (By The Creditor)
Before Filing Of The Bankruptcy PetitionAnother type of automatic stay dispute has arisen particularly in the context of consumer
bankruptcies.492 A matter related to this that has continued to generate controversy is whether a
creditor that has lawfully repossessed a debtor’s property before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition (pre-petition), violates the automatic stay by simply retaining possession of that property
after the automatic stay comes into effect, until adequate protection is offered.493
In In re Diamond Indus. Corp.,494 there was a split of authority as to whether merely
retaining possession amounts to “exercising control” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).495
Section 362(a)(3) provides that any act to obtain property of the estate is expressly subject to the
automatic stay.496
“Under existing law, it may be unclear whether a creditor in rightful possession of a
debtor’s property at the outset of a bankruptcy case must return the property in the absence of
adequate protection.”497 Some courts have held that the creditor has an absolute duty to turn
over the property regardless of adequate protection, and hence that the creditor violates the
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automatic stay if this is not done.498 Others have held that merely retaining the property does not
violate the stay and that the creditor has no duty to surrender the property until adequate
protection is given.499
There are at least four instances in which such disputes might not arise.500 First, if the
debtor had lost all rights in the property pre-petition, the repossessing creditor would not violate
the stay by retaining or disposing of the property after the bankruptcy petition is filed (postpetition).501 For example, if the debtor had been leasing a vehicle under a contract that was a
true lease and not a disguised security arrangement, and if the debtor had defaulted and the lessor
had taken possession of the vehicle, and if there were no contractual or statutory right for the
debtor lessee to cure his or her default after repossession, then the debtor lessee would have lost
all rights in the property.502 In that case, the lessor would not violate the stay by retaining or
selling the item post-petition.503
Second, and conversely, if the secured creditor has lawfully repossessed the property
before the petition, but if the debtor still has rights in the property when the petition is filed, such
as legal title and/or a right of redemption, then the bankruptcy estate would succeed to the
debtor’s rights under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).504 In that case, there would be no disagreement that the
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creditor would violate the stay if it sold the property or otherwise purported to cut off the
debtor’s rights without first obtaining relief from the stay.505
Third, a creditor does not violate the stay if there is a specific statutory exception.506 For
example, if a debtor has been unable to pay for repairs to a vehicle, if applicable state law allows
for a possessory artisan’s lien, and if the creditor has lawfully retained possession before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, pursuant to the artisan’s lien statute, then 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(3)507 shields the creditor if it continues to retain the vehicle post-petition and to assert its
rights under the lien.508
Fourth, in In re U.S. Physicians, Inc.,509 the court held that a creditor that has wrongfully
repossessed the property pre-petition, does not violate the stay by refusing to return the property
post-petition.510 In such a case, the estate acquires the debtor’s right to maintain an action for
replevin, conversion, trespass to chattels, or breach of the underlying contract, but the estate does
not necessarily automatically acquire property itself.511 The rationale is that a refusal to undo a
pre-petition wrong, without more, is not a violation of the stay.512
The real dispute is over whether a creditor who has lawfully repossessed the debtor’s
property pre-petition must turn the property over post- petition, even without adequate
protection, and whether the creditor violates the stay by simply retaining the property until
adequate protection is granted.513 The Eleventh Circuit, in In re Lewis514 has held that, under
Alabama law, a default terminates all of the debtor’s rights under a secured installment sale
505
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contract.515 The debtor no longer has any rights in the collateral.516 Thus, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, a creditor that had lawfully taken possession before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition would not violate the stay by refusing to turn over the property post-petition.517
However, a district court in Florida has held that, under Florida law, title to a vehicle passes upon
default and possession.518 Thus, even if the debtor retains a right of redemption, this, without
more, is not sufficient to make the vehicle estate property, and a creditor, therefore, would not
violate the stay by retaining the vehicle.519 The bankruptcy courts in In re Regan520has followed
this decision while the courts in In re Shannarah521 and in In re Baker522 have rejected it.523
Typically, the dispute over whether a creditor who has lawfully repossessed property prepetition must turn the property over post-petition, (even without the grant of adequate
protection), and whether the creditor violates the stay by simply retaining the property until
adequate protection is granted, arises in consumer cases, and normally the repossessed property
is a motor vehicle.524 Often, the adequate protection controversy involves whether the debtor
must maintain insurance on the vehicle, in addition to whether the debtor must make payments to
the secured creditor, before the creditor is required to return the property.525
Many courts, perhaps a majority, have held that the repossessing secured creditor must
turn over the property upon demand, even without adequate protection, if the debtor still holds
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legal title and if there is still a right to cure.526 If the creditor fails to do so, the creditor will be in
violation of the stay.527
A discussion of some of the relevant cases in this regard follows:
1. In re Knaus528
In this case, which was brought before the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the
Appellant had argued that the Appellee had violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. §
362 when it failed, upon Appellant’s filing for bankruptcy, to voluntarily turn over grain and
equipment it had previously taken from the appellant.529 Appellee had argued that it had no
obligation to turn over property, because it had taken the property before the petition was filed
and the stay imposed.530 The bankruptcy court had held that the creditor violated the automatic
stay of section 362 of the code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, by not voluntarily returning the property after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.531 On appeal, the district court, however, held that the
failure to voluntarily turn over property taken lawfully before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition was not a violation of the automatic stay provisions.532
The Eighth Circuit, reversed the judgment, holding that Appellee’s failure, upon
Appellant’s filing for bankruptcy, to voluntarily turn over property taken before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition violated the stay.533 The court held that Appellant was entitled to punitive
damages because Appellee’s conduct was willful and egregious.534 The court stated that it failed
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to see any distinction between a failure to return property taken before the stay and a failure to
return the property taken after the stay.535 In both cases, the law clearly required turnover.536
The Supreme Court in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc537 had made a distinction in
this regard, in that property seized, but not yet sold before the filing of the bankruptcy petition
was the property of the estate, subject to turnover requirements of section 542.538 The Eighth
Circuit argued that the duty to turn over the property was not contingent upon any predicate
violation of the stay, any order of the bankruptcy court, or any demand by the creditor.539
Rather, the duty would arise upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition.540 The court held that the
failure to fulfill that duty, regardless of whether the original seizure was lawful, constituted a
prohibited attempt to “exercise control over the property of the estate” in violation of the
automatic stay.541
The court cited late Chief Bankruptcy Judge Stewart’s opinion on remand: “ The principle is
simply this: that a person holding property of a debtor who files bankruptcy proceedings
becomes obligated, upon discovering the existence of the bankruptcy proceedings, to return that
property to the debtor (in chapter 11 or chapter 13 proceedings) or his trustee (in chapter 7
proceedings). Otherwise, persons who could make no substantial claim to a debtor’s property in
their possession could, without costs to themselves, compel the debtor or his trustee to bring suit
as a prerequisite to returning the property, the powers of a bankruptcy court and its officers to
collect the estate for the benefit of creditors would be vastly reduced. The general creditors, for
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whose benefit the return of property is sought, would have needlessly to bear the cost of its
return. And those who unjustly retain possession of such property might do so with impunity.”542
2. In re Brooks543
In this case, the dealership had repossessed the debtors’ car on June 20, 1996.544 On June
20, 1996, the debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and started an adversary proceeding
seeking turnover of the car.545 That day, their attorney requested the dealership to return the
car.546 The dealership demanded proof of insurance, which was provided on June 28, 1996.547
The dealership told the debtors that they could pick up the car from a lot about 40 miles away,
but the lot closed for the weekend.548 The debtors had their car towed back and rented a car
while the dealership was in possession.549 Granting the motion in part, the court explained that
the unsecured creditors should not have been called to pay the cost of transporting the vehicle
back to the debtor.550 By making the car available in 40 miles away, the dealership failed to
fulfill its responsibility of returning the car to the debtors’ possession.551 The court held the
response time unreasonable, and three days would have been reasonable.552
The court noted that the dealership’s duty was not dependent on proof of insurance.553
The court found a willful violation, requiring an award of costs.554 However, finding no
egregious conduct, the court awarded no punitive damages.555
542

Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775.
Brooks, 207 B.R. 738 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
544
Id.
545
Id.
546
Id.
547
Id.
548
Id.
549
Id.
550
Id.
551
Id. at 738.
552
Id.
553
Id.
554
Id. at 738-39.
555
Id.

543

58

In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated: “[T]he filing of a bankruptcy petition
imposes automatically a stay upon most actions by creditors to satisfy their claims against the
debtor (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)). Section 542 provides that an entity, including a secured creditor,
who possesses property of the debtor at the time the debtor files a bankruptcy petition shall
deliver to the trustee, an account, for such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.”556 However, the court did not
explain as to what kind of property could be considered inconsequential. The court further held
that the collateral should be returned to the locale of repossession.557 The court noted the
bankruptcy court’s holding in In re Belcher,558 where the creditors had repossessed the vehicle
not knowing that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.559 The Belcher560 court held that although
the repossession occurred from the debtor’s failure to notify the creditor of the bankruptcy filing,
the creditor had a duty to return the vehicle to the place from where it was taken.561
Following are a few cases in which the courts have held that the creditor does not violate the stay
by merely retaining possession of any vehicle or other property, and that the creditor is under no
obligation to turn over the property unless and until the court so orders and adequate protection is
provided:
1. In re Fitch562
The debtor, in this case, had purchased a car on credit and defaulted on the obligation.563
The secured creditor then repossessed the car.564 The debtor then filed her Chapter 13

556

Id. at 740 (quoting Judge Lewis Killian, Jr.).
Id.
558
In re Belcher, 189 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. S.D. Fla., 1995).
559
See Brooks, 207 B.R. at 741.
560
Belcher, 189 Bankr. 16.
561
Belcher, 189 Bankr. at 18.
562
In re Fitch, 217 B.R. 286 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998).
563
Id.
564
Id.

557

59

bankruptcy petition and demanded that the secured creditor return the car.565 The secured
creditor refused to return the car absent showing of adequate protection in the form of
insurance.566 The debtor filed a motion for sanctions against the secured creditors for the
retention of the car after receiving notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, which was
denied.567
The court referred to several decisions568 in the past determining that the secured creditor
was not required to immediately turn over the car.569 In re Schwartz570 and in In re Stringer571
the respective courts had held that only if the repossession takes place post-petition, it would
violate the automatic stay and would, thus, be void and of no effect.572 The Fitch 573court,
arrived at a similar conclusion stating that the repossession of the car was not a violation of the
stay since it had occurred pre-petition.574 According to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), the automatic stay
prohibits, inter alia, any act “to exercise control over the property of the estate.”575 The debtor,
in this case, had argued that by retaining the car, the creditor violated subsection (a)(3) because
retaining the car was an “act” to “exercise control over the property of the estate.”576 The court,
however, found that the right to possess the car was not property of the estate and thus, it did not
find necessary to reach the issue of whether the retention of the car was an “act.”
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In In re Richardson,577 the court held that a violation of § 362(a)(3) required an
affirmative act and that retention of a car repossessed pre- petition was not such an act.578 The
court, in holding that the right to possess the car was not property of the estate, argued that
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines property, states that it includes “all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”579 The
court further explained that this provision was not intended to expand the debtor’s rights against
others more than they existed at the commencement of the case, and thus whatever rights the
debtor had in property at the commencement of the case, continued in bankruptcy, no more, no
less.580 The court stated that property rights were to be determined under state law,581 and
applying the relevant law of the state of California, the court determined that the right to possess
the car was not among the property interests which became property of the estate; and thus
creditors acts to exercise control over the right to possess the car did not violate the stay.582 The
court concluded that “[T]he car was and remained the property of the estate, and repossession did
not change that. The right to possess the car, however, was transferred from the debtor to the
creditor prior to the filing of the petition. Since the debtor did not have the unfettered right to
possession at the time the petition was filed, the unfettered right to possession did not become
property of the estate. Thus, the creditor’s refusal to return the car did not amount to a violation
of the stay.”583
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3. In re Spears584
In this case, the debtor had purchased a vehicle under a retail installment contract and had
financed it through the motor company.585 The debtor failed to make any payments on the
vehicle and the company repossessed it.586 The debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition
and sought for the return of the vehicle.587 This case raised two issues: (i) First, in connection
with the debtor’s claim for return of the vehicle, the creditor argued that the debtor did not
possess sufficient property interest in the vehicle, such that turn over could be ordered.588
Second, the creditor contended that sanctions under § 362(h) were not required in the case as it
had not violated the automatic stay in refusing to return the vehicle after receiving notice of the
debtor’s Chapter 13 filing.589
Citing In re Johnson,590 this court noted that turn over was a remedy to obtain what was
acknowledged to be property of the bankruptcy estate.591 As a result of this, if the debtor did not
have an interest in property at the commencement of the bankruptcy case, turnover could not be
ordered.592
The Spears593 court referenced the decision of the Supreme Court in Whiting Pools,594
where the Court had determined that turnover could be ordered in cases where, prior to the
commencement of reorganization proceedings, property of a Chapter 11 debtor had been
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repossessed by a secured creditor.595 Although an order under § 542(a) modifies a creditor’s
procedural rights available to protect and satisfy its lien, the Court reasoned that the creditor’s
rights under the Bankruptcy Code, including the right to adequate protection, replaced the
protection afforded the creditor by its repossession remedy.596 In addition, the Whiting Pools597
decision had commented that a rehabilitation of a debtor’s business was facilitated if property
subject to creditors’ security interests was included in the reorganization estate.598 The Supreme
Court noted that its analysis depended in part on the reorganization context before it, and the
court left open the question whether § 542(a) would have the same broad effect in liquidation or
adjustment of debt proceedings.599 The Spears600 court noted that under the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) as adopted in most states, after repossession, the debtor’s interest in
the vehicle is a right to redeem the vehicle.601 The court distinguished its holding from the one
in Charles R. Hall Motors v, Inc v. Lewis602 by the Eleventh Circuit court in that Lewis603 court
had reached its result (under the law of Alabama) by finding that a right of redemption is not a
sufficient property interest to warrant turnover of a repossessed vehicle.604 The Spears court
looked to Illinois law discussing the nature of a debtor’s interest in a repossessed vehicle.605 As
under the Alabama cases, the Illinois Appellate Court had found that legal title to property

595

See id. at 206.
Id.
597
Id. at 198.
598
Id at 206-207.
599
Id.
600
Spears, 223 B.R. at 162.
601
Id.
602
Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).
603
Id.
604
See Spears, 223 B.R. at 164 (citing Lewis, 223 B.R. at 1284).
605
See id.

596

63

subject to a security interest passes to a secured creditor after it takes possession following
default.606
As to the question whether a creditor violated the stay by refusing to turn over a debtor’s
vehicle that is repossessed prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the critical question before
the court was whether turnover could be ordered before findings as to adequate protection were
made.607 The court referred to the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Young,608 where the court
stated that the passive act of continuing to possess property did not fall within the prohibition
under § 362(h).609 If a vehicle had been lawfully repossessed pre- petition, the creditor would
have a right to possess the vehicle on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy.610 Since the
purpose of the automatic stay is to maintain the status quo that existed on the date of a debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, the creditor should not have to turn over the vehicle absent assurance that its
pre- petition position would be protected.611 The decision in Young612 commented that if §
362(a)(3) were interpreted as requiring immediate turnover, it would represent a dramatic shift
from the pre-Code practice of allowing secured creditors to retain repossessed collateral until
adequate protection was provided by the debtor.613
Importantly, too, it would contravene the statutory scheme under § § 363(e) and 542(a) to
find that a creditor has an affirmative duty to turn over collateral repossessed prior to
bankruptcy.614 Section 542(a) also limited turnover of property that could be used under §
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363.615 Under § 363(e) the creditor could obtain an order prohibiting a proposed use of the
property unless the estate provided adequate protection.616 This constituted a significant defense
to the grant of a turnover order under § 542(a).617 The defense would be abrogated by an
interpretation of § 362(a)(3) requiring turnover without permitting invocation of the defense.618
Such an approach would be contrary to the logical interaction of § § 363(e) and 542(a).619 The
burden would be on the trustee, when the issue would be raised, to prove adequate protection 11
U.S.C. § 363(o)(1).620 Logically, therefore, the creditor should be entitled to hold onto the
property during the pendency of the § 542 action until adequate protection question is
resolved.621 The obvious rationale implicit in permitting the secured creditor to retain possession
of the seized property while opposing turnover under § 542(a) is that the creditor may suffer the
very harm that adequate protection is designed to avoid if the property is turned over to the
trustee before the trustee proves that the creditor is being given the adequate protection to which
it is entitled.622
An excellent exposition of the competing points of view is given in the majority and the
dissenting opinions in In re Sharon.623 The majority espoused the position that a creditor who
has repossessed pre-petition violates the stay by refusing to surrender the property, even if no
adequate has been offered.624 11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” once a petition is filed.625
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If, under applicable non-bankruptcy law, the debtor still holds legal title to the property or a right
of redemption, the property becomes the property of the estate.626 Anyone holding property as of
the petition date is obliged to turn it over pursuant to § 542(a), even if the debtor would not
necessarily have a right to immediate possession under non-bankruptcy law.627 The Sharon628
majority thus concluded that retaining possession of the repossessed property violates the stay.629
There is nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) that creates an exception to the stay if the creditor does
not have adequate protection, and there is nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) that conditions turnover
on adequate protection.630 If a repossessing creditor wants adequate protection or relief from the
stay, the creditor may seek it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) and/or § 362(f), but a creditor is not
free to engage in self-help by retaining the property on its own initiative until adequate
protection is provided, or by deciding by itself whether there is adequate protection.631
In a well argued dissent, Judge Stosberg expounded the competing view.632 The stay is
designed to freeze the status quo as of the petition date, and hence a mere passive retention of
property lawfully in the creditor’s possession is not an “act” to obtain possession or exercise
control over property of the estate in contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(3).633 While nothing in
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) expressly requires a debtor to provide adequate protection as a precondition
to turnover, neither does anything in 11 U.S.C. § 362 make it wrongful for a creditor to retain
collateral legitimately in its possession merely because a bankruptcy petition has been filed.634
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Hence, Judge Stosberg concluded, that a creditor is entitled to retain the vehicle or other
collateral until the question of adequate protection is resolved.635
Two subsequent decisions, In re Barringer636 and In re Bernstein637 followed the
reasoning of Judge Stosberg’s dissent.638 The majority opinion and Judge Stosberg’s dissent in
Sharon639 provide cogent reasoning for the opposing points of view, both at the level of statutory
interpretation and of policy analysis.640 As the split of authority shows, the relevant statutes
appear to be ambiguous in this context, and the controversy is likely to continue.641

Proposed legislative solutions:
Legislation considered in the 106th Congress in 1999 would have resolved the dispute in favor of
the repossessing creditor.642 Section 135 of H.R. 833 would have added a new Section 1307A to
Chapter 13.643 The proposed statute would have provided that, if a purchase money secured
lender or a lessor of personal property had properly obtained possession of the property prepetition, the creditor would be allowed to retain the property until it received adequate protection
payments.644 Such payments would have to be in the amount and frequency of the payments
required in the underlying contract, unless the court, upon request, ordered lesser amounts or a
different frequency.645 The payments, however, could never be less frequent than monthly, and
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the amount could be no less than the depreciation of the collateral.646 In addition, the debtor
would be required to show that the property was insured no later than 60 days after the petition
was filed.647 Thus, the proposed legislation would have established the views expressed by
Judge Stosberg’s dissent in Sharon.648
Currently, a modified version of this proposal is included in H.R. 333 and in S. 420. The
legislation now under consideration in the 107th Congress has eliminated the addition of a new
Section 1307A to the Bankruptcy Code, and neither bill says anything explicitly about the rights
of a secured creditor or a lessor of personal property that has lawfully taken possession of the
property pre-petition.649 Nonetheless, Section 309 of H.R. 333 and Section 309 of S. 420 would
amend Section 1326(a) of Chapter 13 so as to require the debtor to make adequate protection
payments within 30 days of the order for relief or within 30 days of the filing of a plan,
whichever occurred sooner.650 Moreover, within 60 days of the petition date, the debtor would
have to show that the property was adequately insured.651 These provisions would apply in all
cases involving repossession.652
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VII. CONCLUSIONS:
As the dissent in the two panel opinions in Gruntz I653 and Gruntz II654 correctly
observed, the chief concern of the majority appeared to be that allowing state courts to interpret
the scope and applicability of the automatic stay would lead to unwarranted state court
interference with bankruptcy administration, and to a plethora of state court judgments that
would undermine orderly liquidation or reorganization. However, in the dissenting opinions in
these two cases, Judge Fletcher displayed a deep concern with comity and federalism. State
courts have jurisdiction to interpret and apply federal law unless Congress has deprived them of
that right.655 Federal courts should not purport to oust state courts of jurisdiction unless such a
step is absolutely necessary to protect exclusive federal jurisdiction.656 In fact, from a practical
point of view, the decisions in Gruntz657 could lead to strange consequences. For example, if an
action were brought against the debtor in a state court, and if the state court determined that the
stay did not apply, and went forward to render judgment in the debtor’s favor, the judgment
would have no binding effect because the state court would have had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate the threshold jurisdictional issue of the stay’s applicability.658 The adverse party
could bring another similar action in the bankruptcy court, or, if the action had been one over
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which the bankruptcy court would have had no jurisdiction, the adverse party could seek relief
form the stay and then go back to the original forum for a return match.659
The approach taken in Singleton,660Siskin,661 and Glass662 therefore, seems to be far more
coherent than the views expressed in Gruntz.663 Simply as a practical matter, holding that state
courts have no jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies could lead to all sorts of
difficulties.664 Thus, in my point of view, the best approach to deal with this issue of state court
jurisdiction to determine applicability of the stay, would be for the aggrieved party to seek
review before the state appellate courts, and ultimately, before the United States Supreme court.
Federal courts should not be given the authority to determine whether state courts have
jurisdiction when the automatic stay is at issue.
The issue of a non- bankruptcy tribunal’s jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a violation
of the stay has not arisen frequently. Moreover, the weight of authority holds that, even if a state
court or other federal court has jurisdiction to determine whether the stay applies, only the
bankruptcy court where the case is pending has jurisdiction to call a party to task for violating
the stay.665 On the one hand, exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction over stay violation is essential to
protect the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and its property.
On the other, it has long been settled that only the court whose authority has been violated has
jurisdiction to impose sanctions on the offending party. Thus, state courts should not entertain
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any claims involving sanctions for stay violations, and the same should remain within the
exclusive realm of federal courts.
With respect to the issue as to whether repossession by creditor of debtor’s property prepetition, amounts to stay violation, legislation considered in the 106th Congress, which is
discussed in detail above, would have resolved the dispute in favor of the repossessing creditor.
Currently, a modified version of this proposal, included in H.R. 333 and in S. 420, which is also
discussed in detail above, is now under consideration in 107th Congress. However, the
legislation is silent whether the creditor could retain repossessed property until adequate
protection payments were made. Presumably, however, Section 309 of H.R. 333 and of S. 420
would make it easier for creditors to argue that they should be allowed to retain repossessed
property until the debtor has fulfilled the statutory duties, and that a failure by a debtor to do so
should be grounds of relief from the stay. Judge Stosberg’s dissent and the majority opinion in
Sharon666 provide cogent reasoning for the opposing points of view, both at the level of statutory
interpretation, and of policy analysis. As the split of authority shows, the relevant statutes appear
to be ambiguous in this context, and the controversy is likely to continue.
A provision in the above pending legislation making it mandatory on the part of the repossessing
creditor to return the property, within a specific period of time, once adequate protection
payments are made is likely to solve the above issue. This rule should be applicable even in
cases of unsecured creditors, so as to ensure the benefit of all creditors.
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